


Mortgage Origination Pipeline Risk
Nancy Wallace
Haas School of Business
May 21, 2015


WALTER A. HAAS
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Mortgage Origination and Home Sales, 2001-14




Source: HMDA and NAR

Insufficient Deposits for Mortgage Originations




Source: Flow of Funds

Pre-Crisis Mortgage Market Inter-firm Linkages



Current and Pre-Crisis Mortgage Origination Funding Structures



Pre-crisis New Century Committed MRAs (December 2005)

- **Warehouse Lenders (MRAs) -- TOTAL \$14.35B**
 - Bank of America, N.A. - \$3B
 - Barclays Bank, PLC - \$1B
 - Bear Stearns Mortgage Capital - \$800M
 - Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corporation - \$1.2B
 - Credit Suisse First Boston Capital, LLC - \$1.5B
 - Deutsche Bank - \$1B
 - IXIS Real Estate Capital, Inc - \$850M
 - Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Inc. - \$3B
 - UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. - \$2B
- **Off-Balance Sheet Borrowing -- TOTAL \$2B**
 - Von Karman Funding Trust - \$2B


Pre-crisis Countrywide Mortgage Funding (December 2007)

- **Deposits -- \$60B**
- **MRAs -- \$12.5B**
- **Off Balance Sheet Lines -- \$11.5B**
- **FHLB Advances – \$47.675B**
- **TOTAL -- \$131.675B**

Current Mortgage Origination Funding by PHH Mortgage (December 2015)

- **Fifth largest purchase mortgage originator**
- **Sixth largest refinance mortgage originator**
- **Committed MRA Facilities -- \$1.95B**
 - Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital, LLC -- \$575M
 - Fannie Mae -- \$500M
 - Bank of America, N.A. -- \$400M
 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. -- \$350M
 - Royal Bank of Scotland -- \$150M
- **Uncommitted facilities -- \$2.5B**
 - Fannie Mae -- \$2.5B
- **Off Balance Sheet Lines -- \$250M**
- **TOTAL -- \$4.725B**

Collapse of Off-Balance Sheet Funding (MRA/ABCP)



Source: Moody's Investment Services

Conclusions: Origination Funding Structure is Unrelated to Contract Types

- U.S. Mortgage pipeline funding structure is **fragile**:
 - Pre-crisis mortgage origination funding structures are still dominant – especially master repurchase agreements (MRAs) with 30 day maturities.
 - **MRA funding structures are vulnerable to: 1) securitization speeds; 2) roll-over risk; 3) many other debt covenants (especially accounting triggers) -- this was a very important pre-crisis problem leading to the collapse of lending infrastructure and many firm bankruptcies.**
 - MRAs have repo status so they are exempt from automatic stay -- lenders will rush to be first to cancel.
 - Pipeline “borrowers” have no capital, but they bear the put-back risk – not a sensible set-up.
 - Put back exposure has led all lenders to add risk “overlays” to underwriting criteria – recent GSE limits on future seasoned put-backs may reduce problem.
 - Currently, 30 day securitization speeds from the pipeline is assured by the dominance of GSE securitization and the liquidity provision of the conservatorship – **without GSEs we are back to pre-crisis runs.**